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A No-No From Coco: The Contentious
Relationship Between Luxury Brands and
Resale Websites
Caylee Phillips*
“Perfume is the unseen, but unforgettable, ultimate fashion accessory. . .[that] heralds [your] arrival and prolongs [your] departure.”
– Gabrielle “CoCo” Chanel1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Famous for its iconic perfumes and luxury handbags, Chanel is one of
the most world-renowned luxury brands. Recently, however, Chanel also
made headlines for two lawsuits that could have significant ramifications for
the retail industry. The century-old luxury brand filed suit against two
secondhand luxury retail websites, The RealReal (TRR) and What Goes
Around Comes Around (WGACA), taking issue with the authentication process of the luxury goods the websites have established.2
These lawsuits not only showcase the contentious relationship between
luxury brands and resale companies, but they are also noteworthy because
they are the first of their kind.3 Resale companies have “been able to live in
relatively lawsuit-free existence” because they have fallen squarely within
the bounds of the first sale doctrine.4 The first sale doctrine establishes that
“once a trademark owner, such as Chanel, releases its goods into the market,
it cannot prevent the subsequent re-sale of those goods by their purchasers,
assuming, of course, that the physical condition of the goods in question had
[not] been altered or impaired.”5 The suits are also noteworthy because they
appear to uproot the settled doctrine that secondhand retailers are insulated
*
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1.

June Weir, A Woman’s Distinctive Signature, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 4,
1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/04/magazine/a-woman-s-distinctivesignature.html [https://perma.cc/KHL6-26DF].

2.

See Complaint at 2, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The
RealReal, Inc.]; Complaint at 2, Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes
Around, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-02253 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2018) [hereinafter
Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around].

3.

See The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury
Brands, FASHION L. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/relation
ship-between-luxury-re-sale-luxury-brands-is-rocky/ [https://perma.cc/223Y8DHR].

4.

Id.

5.

Id.
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from trademark infringement liability for products that consumers sell on
their websites, as long as the secondhand retailer does not create confusion
by implying an association between the two retailers.6
This Comment will discuss the ongoing lawsuits Chanel has filed, as
well as the potential effects the outcome of the cases could have on the
secondhand retail industry. Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of luxury fashion, Chanel, and the secondhand luxury retail industry.
Part III will provide a brief overview of the applicable law. These sections
will give a basic understanding of the law underlying the claims—trademark
infringement, counterfeit, false advertising, and unfair competition and deceptive trade practices. Additionally, TRR has filed two counterclaims
against Chanel for antitrust and tortious interference, so a brief background
of this law will conclude the relevant law sections.7 Part IV will detail the
arguments for both sides laid out in the two ongoing lawsuits. Finally,
through analyzing Chanel’s lawsuits against TRR and WGACA, this article
will find that partnerships between luxury brands and secondhand retail websites would establish mutually beneficial relationships because secondhand
retailers can provide valuable consumer data to brands in exchange for
proper authentication procedures of the luxury goods.
II.

BACKGROUND

From Instagram to runways, the fascination with attaining luxury fashion is not a new concept in modern society, but the appeal of luxury goods is
a historically recent cultural phenomenon.8 The word “luxury” actually derives from the French word “luxurie” which means “lust” or “debauchery.”9
Back in ancient times, Romans passed legislation specifically to limit people’s spending on luxury goods because they were concerned with the “disruptive power of gratuitousness and excess.”10 In Greece, people were
shunned for eating fish because it was shameful to be able to “afford such
expensive foodstuff.”11 And, in Britain during the Middle Ages, it was con6.

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that eBay was not liable for trademark infringement based on counterfeits sold
because eBay’s platform allowed users to directly list products. eBay did not
guarantee authenticity of products, nor did it have any part in the description of
the terms listed).

7.

See Memorandum in Support of the The RealReal, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to
File Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims at 1–2, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2020)
[hereinafter Mem. in Supp. of TheRealReal’s Motion for Leave].

8.

See Rae Oliver, A Brief History of Luxury, TRULY (Jan. 27, 2020), https://trulyexperiences.com/blog/brief-history-luxury/ [https://perma.cc/R8KH-V8MJ].

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.
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sidered “bad form” to have something expensive or not easily attainable.12
But as the world evolved so did society’s perception on luxury. The industrial revolution in the 19th century brought a demand for luxury goods that
has continued to escalate over time.13 Luxury today not only symbolizes our
fashion sense, but it also “defines our political, social, and economic standing
and our self-worth.”14
Gabrielle “CoCo” Chanel was born on August 19, 1883.15 While her
early life was plagued with hardships, Chanel forged one of the most revolutionary luxury fashion brands.16 Chanel opened her first shop in 1910, and
the brand quickly became known for elegant, simple, and luxuriously constructed clothes.17 Chanel’s inspiration for the iconic little black dress drew
from her unique upbringing.18 The renowned Chanel No.5 remains one of the
world’s most recognized perfumes, and the launch of this iconic scent was
the first perfume released from a fashion brand.19
After a hiatus from fashion during World War II, Chanel returned to
fashion at the age of seventy-one and once again took over the world with
her classic designs.20 Chanel passed away in 1971, but Karl Lagerfeld has
continued her legacy.21 The Chanel brand remains known today for its classy
designs and functional women’s clothing and accessories.22
With luxury fashion still on the rise, secondhand resale websites have
become a popular alternative for younger generations to attain coveted items
at discounted prices.23 Resale companies have also become increasingly vital
to the growing sustainability movement with more consumers flocking to
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Harry Hurt III, Luxury, and How it Became Common, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/business/yourmoney/19shelf.html
[https://perma.cc/8WXV-LYYU].
15. Inside Chanel, CHANEL, https://inside.chanel.com/en/timeline/1883_birth-ofgabrielle-chanel (last visited Feb. 12, 2022) [https://perma.cc/S37T-GEHH].
16. See History of the Brand: Chanel, LUXURY VINTAGE (June 5, 2020), https://
www.biography.com/fashion-designer/coco-chanel [https://perma.cc/2E86KTMB] (after her mother’s death and father’s sequential abandonment,
Gabrielle grew up in an orphanage raised by nuns).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See History of the Brand: Chanel, supra note 16.
23. See Kassidy Michel, Chanel v. TheRealReal: Luxury Meets Resale, U. CIN. L.
REV. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/12/14/chanel-v-therealreal-luxury-meets-resale/ [https://perma.cc/CG3Q-RSYY].
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their websites.24 Resale companies have created a “$27 billion market that is
projected to raise to $51 billion by 2023” and “occupy at least 10% of the
retail industry.”25
While some luxury brands have embraced this new trend, others
(namely Chanel) have become increasingly wary of their influence on consumers.26 Many brands—like Gucci, Balenciaga, Saint Laurent, and Bottega
Veneta—have chosen to partner with these companies to obtain valuable
consumer data or create consignment partnerships or promotional relationships.27 The CEO of Vestiaire Collective has even said that resale is “a point
of entry-level access for young customers who can’t yet shop full price
luxury.”28
Instead of recognizing the potential for partnerships, Chanel has filed
suit against the secondhand retail websites—one against WGACA and one
against TRR.29 These two cases highlight a potentially harmful outcome for
online resellers of luxury goods. Not only do these cases showcase the arguably monopolistic power that some luxury bands can establish over their
goods beyond the first sale, but also the harmful consequences this unchecked power could have on both the market and the goodwill of the brands
themselves.30 Partnerships between luxury brands and online resellers is good
for both consumers and luxury brands because the online retailers will establish a secondary market for Millennials and Gen Z consumers, who have
become the top buyers of luxury goods, and allow for a broader consumer
base overall.31
Ideally, to protect this market, the law would require brands to help
secondhand retailers develop procedures to ensure authenticity of goods.32
This would protect the existence of secondhand retailers without risk of
24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

See id.

27.

The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands,
supra note 3.

28.

Id.

29.

See Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., supra note 2; Complaint,
Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, supra note 2.

30.

Chanel is Maintaining a “Monopoly” with the Help of Big Name Retailers,
Publishers, The RealReal Claims in New Filing, FASHION L. (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.thefashionlaw.com/chanel-is-maintaining-a-monopoly-with-thehelp-of-big-name-retailers-publishers-the-realreal-claims-in-new-filing/ [https:/
/perma.cc/6Z7V-5UCH].

31. Sufiana Sharuddin, The Evolution of the Luxury Fashion Market, OMNILYTICS
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://omnilytics.co/blog/the-evolution-of-the-luxury-fashionmarket [https://perma.cc/YYT3-BR8S].
32.

See discussion infra Part V, Section B.
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counterfeits that could tarnish the goodwill of the brands.33 The issue with a
compulsory requirement is it could potentially disclose confidential business
practices of the brands.34 Instead, the law should encourage partnerships between the two while punishing anticompetitive practices.35 Luxury brands
and secondhand retailers could establish their own terms while preventing
the brands from establishing a monopoly.36 Partnerships will balance the established reputation and goodwill luxury brands have spent over a century
establishing with the rightful establishment of a secondary market.37
III.
A.

TRADEMARK AND RELATED LAW

Background of Intellectual Property Protection in Luxury Goods

Fashion innovation is protected through intellectual property (IP) law
because fashion “emanates from an individual’s creativity and vision” while
IP provides the legal framework to protect that creativity.38 IP protection is
extremely vital to luxury brands because it allows companies to “generate[ ]
customer loyalty and add[ ] to the commercial value” of the companies.39
Further, luxury brands must capitalize on the IP rights available to “deter
others from copying their designs” and to “distinguish their brand’s image”
in order to be successful.40
However, the United States’ intellectual property framework is not necessarily set up to provide fashion companies the protection they seek.41 Currently, in the United States, there is no protection for the “cut of an item of
clothing,” and trademark protection is often based on the brand’s notoriety
and only available to words and marks, “not the design itself.”42 In contrast,
the European Union “affords comprehensive IP protection for clothing, accessory, and footwear design” and trademark and copyright protection for
“other structural facets of and identifiers on clothing, accessories, and foot33.

See discussion infra Part V, Section B.

34.

See Mem. in Supp. of TheRealReal’s Motion for Leave, supra note 7, at 1.

35.

See discussion infra Part V, Section B.

36.

See infra notes 312–320 and accompanying discussion.

37.

See discussion infra Part V, Sections A–B.

38. Lisa Rosaya, Luxury Fashion & the Importance of Intellectual Property, LUXURY SOC’Y (Apr. 18, 2016), https://luxurysociety.com/en/articles/2016/04/luxury-fashion-the-importance-of-intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/HV644XFL].
39.

Id.

40. Shieva Salehnia, A Golden Opportunity: Supporting Up-and-Coming U.S. Luxury Designers Through Design Legislation, 42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 367, 370
(2016).
41.

Id. at 371.

42.

Id.
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wear items.”43 This disconnect is largely because European courts have a
“long-held tradition[ ]” of recognizing design rights.44 The protection is even
more significant in countries like France “where fashion has been heralded as
an art form important for economic and cultural growth.”45
Copyrights protect “original works of authorship, such as writings, music, and works of art, that have been tangibly expressed by the author.”46 To
be tangibly expressed means that one can “perceive[ ], reproduce[ ], or otherwise communicate[ ]” the work.47 However, copyright does not protect useful
articles, such as the “cut or shape of garments, accessories, and furniture.”48
“Useful articles” is defined as “objects having an intrinsic . . . function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”49 Some useful articles might contain “applied art” features that will be
protected, such as a “design and decoration applied to everyday objects to
make them aesthetically pleasing.”50 These features must be separately identifiable and “exist independently” from the useful aspects of the article.51
Because copyright does not apply to useful articles, it is extremely hard for
luxury brands to obtain a copyright for their fashion innovation.52 Even if
their design does receive this protection, the copyright will not apply to the
whole design—it will only apply to the artistic features that exist independent from the useful article.53
Patent law protects inventions that are new, useful, and non-obvious.54
This type of protection pertains to “invented material used in the manufacture
of fashion items or luxury goods” and “innovative methods of manufacturing.”55 Design patents, a special type of patent, pertain to “new, original, and
ornamental design[s] for . . . article[s] of manufacture.”56 Because patent law
43.

Id. at 370–71.

44.

Id. at 371.

45.

Id.

46. Lisa Rosaya, Types of IP—Copyrights, in GLOBAL LEGAL GUIDE
& FASHION COMPANIES § 1:4 (2019 ed. 2019).

FOR

LUXURY

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.; see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002,
1008 (2017) (holding the chevron design on cheer uniforms existed independently from the cheer uniform itself so the design was protectable).

52.

See Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:4.

53.

See id.

54.

See id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.
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pertains to the manufacturing of articles and the protection is limited in duration, patent law does not necessarily lend itself to the protection of the creative designs of fashion brands.57
B.

Trademarks

The limitations of the other two types of IP are the reason that luxury
companies tend to protect their brands in trademark law. Trademark law protects the “words, phrases, symbols, and/or designs used to identify and distinguish the products/services of one party from those of another.”58
Trademarks can also be “the appearance of product designs and product
packaging and designs used in connection with the offering of retail services.”59 Trademark law protects the “owner’s investment in the goodwill
and reputation attached to the mark.”60 Trademark law’s primary function is
to protect consumers from confusion as to the source and “signif[ies] all
goods and services sold or provided under the mark are of an equal level of
quality.”61
To obtain a trademark, the owner registers the mark with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office provided the mark(s) is “distinctive, non-functional,
and serve[s] as an indicator of [a] source; not confusingly similar to a third
party’s mark; and not deceptive.”62 Whether a mark satisfies the “distinctiveness” requirement depends on the “strength of the mark.”63 There are four
categories of marks: (1) fanciful or arbitrary; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive;
and (4) generic.64 Arbitrary or fanciful marks are “words with no meaning, or
words that have meaning but not in relation to the goods or services of interest.”65 Suggestive marks “imply certain attributes” of the goods or services.66
Descriptive marks “describe a purpose, characteristic, quality, user, ingredi-

57.

See id.

58. Rosaya, supra note 38.
59. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6.
60. Rosaya, supra note 38.
61.

Id.

62. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751
(2017) (holding that trademarks can now be disparaging because this requirement was held invalid under the First Amendment protection of free speech); In
re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding immoral or scandalous marks can be registered because there was no substantial government interest in justifying the bar on these marks).
63. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6.
64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.
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ent, feature, or function of the goods or services.”67 Descriptive marks require secondary meaning to acquire trademark protection.68 Generic marks
consist of the “common name for the relevant goods or services.”69 These
categories are a spectrum with the strongest marks being fanciful or arbitrary
and the weakest marks being descriptive.70 Generic marks are not afforded
trademark protection.71
Registration of a mark is not required to have rights in the mark.72 The
United States recognizes common law trademarks that afford some degree of
trademark rights “derive[d] from [the] use of the mark.”73 However, registration provides advantages to the brands such as notice to the public, “legal
presumption of ownership,” and “prima facie evidence of the owner’s exclusive right[s].”74
1.

Trademark Infringement

Trademark owners have the right “to prevent others from registering or
using an identical or confusingly similar mark in connection with [the] goods
or services.”75 This right includes circumstances where another uses the mark
to confuse or deceive consumers into believing that: “the third party is affiliated, connected, or associated with the trademark owner”; “the third party’s
goods or services derive from the trademark owner”; or “the trademark
owner sponsors or approves the third party’s goods or services.”76
Trademark infringement analysis involves two steps: (1) “whether the
mark merits protection,” and (2) “whether the alleged[ ] infringing use of the
mark (or a similar mark) is likely to cause consumer confusion.”77 The “central inquiry” under Section 32(a) of the Lanhma Act is “the likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled,
or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”78 However, the Lanham Act does not “impose liability for the sale of genuine goods
67.

Id.

68.

Id. (Secondary meaning means that “consumers have come to recognize the
owner as the unique source of that particular product or service.”).

69. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6.
70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6.
76.

Id.; Lanham Act § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).

77. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
78.

Id. at 436.
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bearing a true mark” even if “the sale is not authorized by the mark owner.”79
Further, the Lanham Act “does not prevent one who trades a branded product
from accurately describing it by its brand name” as long as the third party
“does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the owner of the
product.”80 Likelihood of confusion requires a “probability of confusion, not
a mere possibility.”81
There are multiple tests among the circuits to determine the likelihood
of confusion, but the Second Circuit uses an eight-factor balancing test established in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.82 The factors are:
(1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products and their competitiveness with one another;
(4) evidence that the senior user may “bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the market of the alleged infringer’s product; (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) evidence that
the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality
of the products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant market.83
In addition to considering these factors, courts consider “nominative fair
use” factors.84 Nominative fair use is a defense to trademark infringement
and permits another to “refer to the trademark owner’s goods and services
associated with the mark.”85 These factors are: (1) “whether the use of the
plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s product or service
and the defendant’s product or service . . . “; (2) “whether the defendant uses
only as much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to identify the product or
service”; and (3) “whether the defendant did anything that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the plaintiff.”86
Wrongful intent is not required for an action for trademark infringement, and
acting in good faith is no defense.87 The Lanham Act is a strict liability stat-

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

Id. at 436 (quoting Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27,
37 (2d Cir. 2016)).

82.

Id. at 436 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1961)).

83.

The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 436–37.

84.

Id. at 437.

85.

Fair Use of Trademarks, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, https://www.inta.org/factsheets/fair-use-of-trademarks-intended-for-a-non-legal-audience/ [https://
perma.cc/VP9C-LXMK] (last updated Jan. 31, 2016).

86.

The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 437.

87.

Id. at 438.
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ute, and a “retailer’s direct sale of an infringing product is sufficient” to establish liability.88
If a mark is a well-known or famous mark, the mark may gain “special
protection.”89 The special protection grants the owner rights in all “classes of
goods and services.”90 This means than an owner can not only sue a third
party for infringement based on likelihood of consumer confusion but also
sue on dilution grounds.91 There are two types of dilution: blurring and
tarnishment.92 Blurring arises when the “connection in consumers’ minds between the famous mark and the goods or services with which that mark is
used is weakened.”93 Tarnishment occurs when the “defendant’s use is unsavory or unwholesome, or the mark is used in connection with inferior
products.”94
2.

Counterfeits

A counterfeit is a use of a trademark that is a “knock-off” for the same
type of good that the genuine mark was registered.95 Counterfeits are so similar in design to the genuine goods that it is “evident what item the knock off
was copying.”96 Counterfeits are a specific type of trademark infringement.97
To bring a counterfeit action, the trademark must be registered.98 While
trademark infringement requires balancing of the likelihood of confusion factors, counterfeiting does not because “counterfeit marks are inherently confusing.”99 Counterfeits are prosecuted under both criminal and civil laws if
they are likely to cause consumer confusion.100
88.

Id. (quoting GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)).

89. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:6.
90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95. Colleen Jordan Orscheln, Bad News Birkins: Counterfeit in Luxury Brands, 14
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 249, 254 (2015).
96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 253.

98.

Id.

99. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(quoting Spin Master Ltd. v. Alan Yuan’s Store, 325 F. Supp. 3d 413, 421
(S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
100. Orscheln, supra note 95, at 254 (explaining that a civil action is prosecuted
under the Lanham Act while a criminal action is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320).
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False Advertising

Section 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act establishes a cause of action for
false advertising.101 The elements of false advertising are: “(1) a false or misleading statement of fact; that is (2) used in a commercial advertisement or
promotion; that (3) deceives or is likely to deceive in a material way; (4) in
interstate commerce; and (5) has caused or is likely to cause competitive or
commercial injury to the plaintiff.”102 False advertising is brought on one of
two theories: (1) the advertisements are “literally false” or (2) the advertisements, while not “literally false,” tend to “mislead or confuse consumers.”103
On either theory, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the false or misleading advertisement “involved an inherent or material quality of the product.”104 Further, the plaintiff must prove that the advertisement “is the cause
of actual or likely injury” to them.105
To prove literal falsity, the plaintiff must show that “the advertisement
either makes an express statement that is false or a statement that is ‘false by
necessary implication.’”106 False by necessary implication means that the advertisements, considered in context, “necessarily and unambiguously imply a
false message.”107 To establish that the advertisements tend to mislead or
confuse consumers, the plaintiff must show that “a statistically significant
part of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated.”108 False advertising is only actionable for “false misrepresentations or
statements of fact” and does not apply to statements of opinion or subjective
claims about products.109

101. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
102. Do I Have a Lanham Act Claim Against My Competitor for False Advertising?,
BONA LAW PC, https://www.businessjustice.com/do-i-have-a-lanham-claimagainst-my-competitor-for-false-adverti.html [https://perma.cc/6UT8-M8DA]
(last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
103. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Time
Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2007))
104. Id. (quoting Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 153 n.3).
105. Church & Dwight Co. v. SPF Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH, 843 F.3d
48, 65 (2d Cir. 2016).
106. Id. (quoting Time Warner Cable, 497 F.3d at 158).
107. Id.
108. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112–13.
109. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(quoting Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995)).

456

D.
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Unfair Competition and Deceptive Trade Practices

An unfair competition claim requires a showing of “either actual confusion or a likelihood of confusion.”110 The plaintiff must also prove bad faith
or intent on the part of the defendant.111 Bad faith is “an attempt by a junior
user of the mark to exploit the good will and reputation of a senior user by
adopting the mark with the intent to sow confusion.”112 If a counterfeit mark
is involved, bad faith is presumed as long as the “defendants were aware of
the counterfeiting.”113
Section 349 of the New York General Business Law establishes the
cause of action for deceptive trade practices.114 The elements of this cause of
action are: (1) the “challenged transaction was ‘consumer-oriented’ ”; (2) the
“defendant engaged in deceptive or materially misleading acts or practices”;
and (3) the “plaintiff was injured by reason of defendant’s deceptive or misleading conduct.”115 The non-consumer plaintiff must prove that the alleged
conduct has “significant ramifications for the public at large.”116 This means
that there has to be “specific and substantial injury to the public interest over
and above ordinary trademark infringement.”117
E.

Antitrust

Antitrust claims are governed by the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).118 The Sherman Act outlaws “every contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade” and “any monopolization,
attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize.”119
The FTC Act bars “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive
110. Id. at 446 (requirements under New York common law).
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir.
2005)).
113. Id. (quoting BBK Tobacco & Goods, LLP v. Galazy VI Corp., 408 F. Supp. 3d
508, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)).
114. Id. (quoting Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Noom, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 3d 361,
381 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)).
115. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 446 (quoting Weight Watchers, 403 F. Supp.
3d at 381).
116. Id. (quoting RCA Trademark Mgmt. S.A.S. v. VOXX Int’l Corp., No.
14CV6294-LTS-HBP, 2015 WL 5008762, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2015)).
117. Id. at 447.
118. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/
LBY3-VNTH] (last visited Feb. 24, 2022).
119. Id.
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acts or practices.”120 Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) does not
enforce the Sherman Act, it can bring actions “against the same kinds of
activities that violate the Sherman Act.”121
In any antitrust claim, the first step is to determine the “relevant market.”122 The relevant market is a set of products that one has “control over in
order to retain the consumers.”123 Determination of the relevant market is “an
empirical matter” and is “closely related to the ability to exert monopoly
power.”124 One has monopoly power when they are able to control prices and
the consumers will not “shift their demand to some other product which one
doesn’t control.”125 The Second Circuit has explained that while market share
is a relevant determination, the court should also consider monopoly power
after “full consideration of the relationship between market share and other
relevant market characteristics.”126 The other relevant factors include “barriers to entry, the elasticity of consumer demand, and the nature of the anticompetitive conduct such as whether there is ‘exclusionary conduct without
justification of efficiency.’”127 Thus, the Second Circuit has “permitted findings of market power with [relevant market] shares less than 50%.”128
F.

Tortious Interference

Tortious interference is a “common law tort [that allows] a claim for
damages against a defendant who wrongfully interferes with the plaintiff’s
contractual or business relationships.”129 There are two types of tortious interference: interference with contractual relations and interference with pro120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ben Kleinman, Luxury Markets, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property: An Introduction, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 742, 744 (2008).
123. Id. at 745.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. The RealReal’s Reply Memorandum in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for
Leave to File Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims at
11–12, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
24, 2020) (quoting Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98
(2d Cir. 1998)) [hereinafter Reply in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for
Leave].
127. Id. at 12 (quoting M&M Med. Supplies & Servs., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp.
Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1992).
128. Id. at 12–13 (quoting New York v. Actavis, PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL
7015198, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014)).
129. Tortious Interference, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tortious_interference [https://perma.cc/F8P8-5FJS] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
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spective business relations.130 There are four conditions that must be met to
allege a claim for tortious interference with business relations under New
York law: (1) “business relations with a third party”; (2) “the defendants
interfered with those business relations”; (3) “the defendants acted for a
wrongful purpose”; and (4) “the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.”131
For this type of tortious interference, the plaintiff must also prove that they
would have entered into a contract with the third party if it had not been for
the defendant’s conduct.132 The elements are the same for tortious interference with contractual relations, except the first two elements would be: (1)
contractual relations with a third party, and (2) the defendants interfered with
those contractual relations.133
IV.

CHANEL V. SECONDHAND RETAILERS

This section will focus on an overview of two ongoing cases filed by
Chanel against two secondhand retail websites, TRR and WGACA. These
cases highlight the “still-largely-unsettled relationship” between luxury
brands and retail companies and what many luxury brands have voiced concerns about over the years.134 Despite the familiar bitterness, resale websites
and luxury brands have remained in relatively conflict-free coexistence because of the well settled first sale doctrine.135 The cases’ impending outcomes could mean a change in the luxury fashion industry as it is now
known, making them a highly watched line of cases.
This section will start with a brief discussion of the case Chanel filed
against WGACA and will end with a discussion of the case Chanel filed
against TRR. The TRR case implicates a lengthier discussion because TRR
has filed four counterclaims against Chanel for antitrust, anticompetition, and
tortious interference with both contract and prospective business relations
based on alleged findings in discovery of the WGACA case.136 Both cases
have a preliminary decision by the court—a limited grant of a motion to

130. What is Tortious Interference?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-is-tortious-interference.html [https://perma.cc/H8TK-7EZ8] (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
131. Reply in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for Leave, supra note 126, at 25
(quoting Scutti Enter., L.L.C. v. Park Place Ent. Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
132. Id.
133. What is Tortious Interference?, supra note 130 (elements three and four would
be exactly the same).
134. The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands,
supra note 3.
135. Id.
136. Reply in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for Leave, supra note 126, at 1.
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dismiss in favor of the resale companies; however, both cases are largely
ongoing.137
A.

Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC

Chanel filed their initial lawsuit against WGACA on March 14, 2018.138
Chanel asserted claims for: (1) counterfeiting and trademark infringement
under Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1141(1); (2) false advertising under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(B); (3) unfair competition and endorsement and association
under Section 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (4) unfair competition
and false advertising under Sections 349 and 350 of the New York General
Business Law, respectively; and (5) unfair competition under New York
common law.139 The crux of their argument was that WGACA was representing itself as a “leading global purveyor of authentic luxury vintage accessories and apparel” and certified that all of their goods were “100%
Authenticity Guaranteed.”140 Chanel argues this was an attempt to “deceive
consumers into falsely believing” that WGACA had an affiliation or a relationship with Chanel or “that Chanel has authenticated WGACA’s goods in
order to trade off of Chanel’s brand and good will.”141 Specifically, Chanel
argues WGACA’s use of their trademark in advertisements, social media,
and on their website misleads consumers as to the source of the goods.142
Further, Chanel argues that there is evidence of WGACA selling counterfeit
items including a handbag and a fake Chanel-branded tissue box cover.143
1.

What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss

WGACA filed a motion to dismiss the suit on June 18, 2018, alleging
that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support the claims for
infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising.144 WGACA first argued that Chanel failed to support a probability, not just mere possibility, of
137. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2020);
Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, No. 18 Civ. 2253
(LLS), 2018 WL 4440507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018).
138. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, supra note 2, at
1.
139. Id. at 3–4.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. Memorandum of Law in Support for Motion to Dismiss at 1, Chanel, Inc. v.
What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-02253 (S.D.N.Y. June
18, 2018) [hereinafter Mem. of Law in Support – WGACA Motion to
Dismiss].
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likelihood of consumer confusion by their use of the Chanel mark on their
website and in advertising.145 Further, WGACA argued that their use of Chanel’s trademarks on their websites was nominative fair use because they are
merely using the marks to identify goods offered for sale.146
Secondly, WGACA argued that the complaint failed under the first sale
doctrine.147 WGACA recounted that the “right of the producer to control distribution of its products does not extend beyond the first sale of the product.”148 Chanel only asserted that the products WGACA sold “may” include
counterfeits, but WGACA contended this assertion was “purely speculative
and couched in terms that avoid any direct allegation of fact.”149 Moreover,
WGACA argued that Chanel had not presented any allegations of fact that
supported the argument that the products WGACA sold on their website are
not products originally sold by Chanel.150
WGACA further argued that Chanel had not asserted facts to support
the claims for false advertising.151 WGACA detailed that, for a claim of false
advertising, Chanel must prove that the statements made were either literally
false, either explicitly on their face or by necessary implication.152 Specifically, WGACA argued Chanel contends the inclusion of Chanel’s trademarks
were literally false by necessary implication because it necessarily implied
that Chanel is associated with WGACA or authorized WGACA to sell its
products.153 In contrast, WGACA argued the inclusion of their trademarks is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and therefore cannot be
literally false.154
Lastly, WGACA asserted that Chanel failed to adequately state a claim
for relief under New York common law for unfair competition and New
York general business law for deceptive business practices.155 For unfair
competition, WGACA asserted that Chanel did not prove that WGACA acted

145. Id. at 5–6 (quoting Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743
(2d Cir. 1998)) (requiring a showing of probability of confusion for infringement claims as opposed to a mere possibility).
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 8–9.
148. Id. (citing Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539 (2013)).
149. Id. at 9.
150. Mem. of Law in Support – WGACA Motion to Dismiss, supra note 144, at 9.
151. Id. at 9–11.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 12–14.
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in bad faith, a requirement under New York law.156 Further, WGACA simply
asserted that Chanel failed to point to any misleading business practice.157
2.

Chanel’s Opposition to What Goes Around Comes Around,
LLC’s Motion to Dismiss

Chanel filed a memorandum of law in opposition to WGACA’s motion
to dismiss, arguing WGACA’s conduct is squarely within the express language of the Lanham Act, not protected under nominative fair use, not protected under the first sale doctrine, and supported by Chanel’s state law
claims.158 Chanel asserted that WGACA is not merely using their mark to
identify the products being sold, but instead, is seeking to use the “powerful
strength of the CHANEL brand and trademarks to free ride off of Chanel’s
goodwill.”159 Yet, Chanel remained adamant that they are not trying to restrain WGACA’s sale of secondhand goods nor its use of their marks when
necessary to identify the products, but they are merely trying to stop “deceptive use of CHANEL Trademarks and misleading and marketing tactics.”160
Specifically, Chanel further reiterated that WGACA purports to authenticate Chanel products with the promise of “100% authenticity guaranteed”
without any training or authorization by Chanel.161 Chanel emphasized that
WGACA is misleading consumers by not advising customers that WGACA
is “not affiliated with or sponsored by Chanel or that the products offered
have not been authenticated by Chanel.”162 Further, Chanel took issue with
WGACA’s advertising and marketing, arguing that the hashtag “#WGACACHANEL” and other former Chanel advertisements were featured on
their social media “without authorization [by Chanel].”163 Chanel also referenced advertisements featured on their brick-and-mortar stores featuring the
Chanel trademark and pictures of their iconic products such as Chanel
No.5.164 The luxury brand argued that these advertisements, featuring their
goods and registered trademark, infringe their rights and create a false associ156. Mem. of Law in Support – WGACA Motion to Dismiss, supra note 144, at 1,
12.
157. Id. at 13.
158. Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8–25,
Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-02253
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018)) [hereinafter Mem. of Law in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss – WGACA].
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 4.
162. Id. at 5.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Mem. of Law in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss – WGACA,
supra note 158, at 7.
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ation in the mind of the consuming public.165 Thus, the crux of Chanel’s
argument was the repeated use and prominent display of their trademark and
goods in total amount to trademark infringement as they allege that the use is
more than necessary to accurately describe the products being sold by
WGACA.166
3.

Southern District of New York’s Decision on the Motion to
Dismiss

On September 14, 2018, the Southern District of New York granted
WGACA’s motion to dismiss in part.167 The court denied the motion to dismiss in relation to the claims for trademark infringement, false endorsement,
and false advertising under the Lanham Act.168 The court reasoned that
WGACA’s use of the hashtag “#WGACACHANEL,” as well as the prominence and repeated use of the marks, was likely to cause confusion to consumers as to the source of the goods or a false affiliation between Chanel and
WGACA.169
Additionally, the court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the
claims for deceptive business practices under Section 349 of the New York
General Business Law and false advertising under New York General Business Law.170 The court determined that the complaint evidenced advertising
and marketing business practices that “could deceive customers or constitute
false advertising.”171 Specifically, the court stated WGACA’s website “may
suggest an affiliation or sponsorship with Chanel by prominently displaying
Chanel-branded goods and Chanel trademarks.”172
However, the court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the
unfair competition claim under New York common law.173 The common law
unfair competition claim is like claims under the Lanham Act, except New
York law requires a showing of bad faith.174 The court held that Chanel made
no showings that WGACA intended to impart confusion between the two
companies’ products; in fact, the court understood WGACA’s intent was to
165. Id. at 6–7.
166. Id.
167. Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, No. 18 Civ. 2253
(LLS), 2018 WL 4440507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018).
168. Id. at *2–4.
169. Id. at *3.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, 2018 WL 4440507, at *4.
174. Id.
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“display the Chanel brand conspicuously, and emphasize that their source
was Chanel.”175
B.

Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc.

Chanel filed their initial suit against TRR on November 14, 2018.176
Their initial complaint was largely the same as the initial complaint against
WGACA—alleging counterfeiting and trademark infringement under Section
32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); unfair competition and false
endorsement and association under Section 43(a)(1)(B) under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); unfair competition under Section 349 of the
New York Business Law; false advertising under Section 350 of the New
York General Business Law; and unfair competition under the common law
of New York.177 Chanel argued that TRR represented to consumers that
“[TRR] is authentic” and that they “ensure[d] that every item on The
RealReal is 100% real things” thanks to a “dedicated team of authentication
experts.”178 This, Chanel argued, led consumers to believe that TRR had approval “from or an association or affiliation with Chanel,” which Chanel denied.179 Further, Chanel alleged that there was evidence of TRR selling seven
counterfeit Chanel bags as if they were authentic.180
Like in the WGACA case, Chanel asserted that TRR was “piggybacking
on the reputation” of their brand.181 The luxury brand indicated that all guarantees of authenticity by TRR are in vain because “only Chanel itself can
know what is genuine Chanel.”182 Furthermore, Chanel urges the counterfeit
bags that TRR allegedly sold are additional evidence of improper authentication procedures.183 Chanel supported the false advertising and false endorsement claims by the sale of counterfeits to prove that their authenticity
guarantee is impliedly false and creates a “false impression” in the minds of
consumers.184

175. Id. at *4–5.
176. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., supra note 2, at 1.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 2, 11–12.
180. Id. at 11–12.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Complaint, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., supra note 2, at 11.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Id. at 13.
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The RealReal’s Motion to Dismiss

TRR countered by filing a motion to dismiss, asserting that Chanel
failed to state a claim for all issues.185 TRR asserted that Chanel has “no right
to control the secondary market” based on settled trademark law and consumer rights.186 TRR called the suit an “effort by Chanel to uproot this settled
doctrine to the detriment of consumers, undermine consumer confidence in
the secondary market, and stifle legitimate competition.”187 Further, TRR
contended that Chanel’s sweeping claim that only they can authenticate their
products “would make it impossible for all secondary dealers to do
business.”188
TRR also took specific issue with Chanel’s claims that “TRR’s marketing of Chanel products or its representations about authenticity imply any
affiliation between the parties” because TRR explicitly stated that “The
RealReal’s authentication process is unique to The RealReal and independent
of any brands.”189 Additionally, TRR’s websites states that “none of the
brands sold assume any responsibility for any products featured through the
website,” and that “[b]rands sold on The RealReal are not partnered or affiliated with The RealReal in any manner.”190
Furthermore, TRR asserted Chanel’s claims for trademark infringement,
counterfeiting, and false endorsement/unfair competition fail for two distinct
reasons.191 First, Chanel did not sufficiently plead facts to establish a likelihood of consumer confusion because they did not established that a “reasonable consumer would believe that TRR is affiliated with Chanel.”192 Instead,
TRR reminded that trademark law allows TRR’s use of the mark to “describe
and promote the sale of Chanel goods” as nominative fair use.193 Second,
TRR argued their business practices are protected under the first sale doctrine.194 Chanel is only “entitled to control the initial sale of its branded
goods,” but once the goods have entered the market, “the first sale rule bars
185. Memorandum of Law in Support of The RealReal’s Motion to Dismiss at 1,
Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
2019) [hereinafter Mem. of Law in Support of The RealReal’s Motion to
Dismiss].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id.
191. Mem. of Law in Support of The RealReal’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 185,
at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1.
194. Id. at 2–3.
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Chanel from dictating to consumers when or how they may part with their
Chanel items.”195
Likewise, TRR argued that Chanel’s claim for false advertising also
fails.196 With regards to the authentication process, TRR has an express disclaimer that would defeat any likelihood of consumer confusion allegations.197 Also, Chanel’s claim that TRR “falsely and/or misleadingly
represents to consumers The RealReal’s ability to authenticate secondhand
CHANEL products” is not supported because TRR only warrants that they
authenticate their products through their own “internal, proprietary process.”198 Lastly, TRR asserted that the unfair competition claim under New
York law and similar claims under New York General Business law were
unsupported because Chanel did not adequately allege that TRR acted in bad
faith with intent to confuse consumers, “nor that TRR’s conduct resulted in a
public harm above and beyond ordinary trademark infringement.”199
2.

Chanel’s First Amended Complaint in Response to The
RealReal’s Motion to Dismiss

On February 1, 2019, Chanel amended their complaint “adding some
additional assertions to ideally bolster its existing trademark infringement,
counterfeiting, and false advertising claims.”200 In combination with their
first complaint about the TRR allegedly piggybacking off of their reputation,
Chanel further emphasized the “representations and guarantees that TRR
makes to consumers about its staffs’ ability to properly and fully authenticate
real Chanel products” is misleading to consumers.201 Chanel also asserted
that none of the TRR’s authentication team was, in fact, “properly qualified
or trained in authentication of Chanel products to support [TRR’s] claims as
to the genuineness of the products it resell[s].”202 Chanel adamantly asserts
195. Id. at 1–3 (emphasis omitted).
196. Id. at 3.
197. Mem. of Law in Support of The RealReal’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 185,
at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3–4.
200. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, FASHION L. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.thefashionlaw.com/
chanel-to-the-realreal-your-authentication-experts-arent-experts-at-all/ [https://
perma.cc/77ZS-TLTY]; see also Chanel’s First Amended Complaint at 3–4,
Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2019) [hereinafter Chanel’s First Am. Complaint].
201. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 20000 (internal quotations omitted); Chanel’s
First Am. Complaint, supra note 200, at 12–13.
202. Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note 20000, at 12.
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that “only products purchased directly from Chanel and its authorized retailers can be certain to be” and advertised as “genuine and authentic.”203
Additionally, the luxury brand emphasized that any disclaimer by TRR
that they are not associated or affiliated with Chanel was “not sufficient to
adequately qualify, contextualize, explain, or negate the representations and
guarantees.”204 “Any disclaimer that [TRR] purports to offer consumers to
distance itself from the brands of products it resells is neither present nor
sufficiently conspicuous or likely to be seen by all consumers prior to
purchasing from [TRR].”205
Chanel also took issue with TRR’s alleged practice of “removing [Chanel] serial numbers from all of its Chanel branded leather goods product listings” which they claim took place after they notified TRR about the alleged
counterfeit items.206 Since removing the serial number would be of “no benefit to consumers,” Chanel alleged that TRR did this “to frustrate attempts to
determine whether [TRR’s] Chanel-branded goods are of questionable origin
or counterfeit” and done as a “dishonest means [of] unfairly competing.”207
Further, the luxury brand pointed to complaints to the Better Business Bureau from consumers “as a result of [TRR’s] false and misleading business
practices.”208
Finally, Chanel argued that TRR’s use of the term “vintage” to describe
some of the Chanel products when “in fact they are not vintage products, and
instead, are likely less than 20 years old.”209 The luxury brand claimed this is
false advertising because the FTC’s definition of vintage is “an item that is at

203. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 10.
204. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 13.
205. Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note 200, at 13.
206. Id. at 19; Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts”
Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200.
207. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am.Complaint, supra note
200, at 19.
208. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 20.
209. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 14.
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least 50 years old.”210 By describing products as “vintage” that are not at
least fifty years old, Chanel claimed this “mispresent[ed] the nature and
description of secondhand Chanel-branded products.”211
3.

Southern District of New York’s Decision on the Motion to
Dismiss

On March 30, 2020, the Southern District of New York granted TRR’s
motion to dismiss in part.212 The court granted the motion to dismiss with
respect to trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C § 1114(a)(1), false endorsement and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), deceptive and unfair trade practices under New York General Business law Section
349, and false advertising under New York General Business Law Section
350.213 The court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to these claims
because TRR’s use of genuine Chanel trademarks was not likely to cause
consumer confusion, and Chanel did not adequately allege injury to the public at large.214
The court started the analysis by noting that the Lanham Act “does not
prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by its
brand name, so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an
affiliation with the owner of the product.”215 After applying the Polaroid factors, the court determined Chanel did not allege facts sufficient for its infringement, false endorsement, or unfair competition claims.216 Chanel’s
trademarks are “incredibly well-known, recognizable, and prevalent in the
luxury fashion market,” and even though TRR’s sale of their products may
directly compete with Chanel, there was also evidence in the record that a
secondhand market “bolsters primary markets.”217 Further, Chanel itself has
admitted that it does not sell secondhand or vintage Chanel goods, so with
respect to these products, TRR was not directly competing with Chanel.218
210. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 14.
211. Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t Really Experts at All, supra note 200; Chanel’s First Am. Complaint, supra note
200, at 14.
212. Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 422, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
213. Id. at 429.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 438 (quoting Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d
295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 438–39.
218. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
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Additionally, the court reminded that Chanel has “identified no evidence of actual customer confusion” or that TRR “adopted the genuine use of
Chanel Trademarks in bad faith.”219 The court also asserted that the luxury
fashion market is “relatively sophisticated” in that consumers of luxury
goods are more knowledgeable about luxury brands, so the risk of consumer
confusion is low.220
The court also determined that Chanel did not sufficiently allege that
TRR’s use of Chanel trademarks “stepped over the line into a likelihood of
[consumer] confusion” by the use of marks “too prominently or too often, in
terms of size, emphasis, or repetition.”221 Even though TRR’s website has a
page describing the Chanel brand, TRR also has pages for nine other luxury
brands.222 Chanel did not identify any facts “suggesting that [TRR] displays
Chanel-branded goods ‘more prominently than other luxury-branded
goods.’”223 There were also no facts to suggest that TRR used the marks in
any way other than to identify Chanel products as Chanel.224 Further, the
court ruled that Chanel “offered no non-conclusory allegations to suggest
that [TRR] inaccurately depicts its relationship with Chanel or Chanel’s
products and services.”225 The court found TRR’s disclaimer on its website
sufficient to abrogate consumer confusion as to TRR’s association with the
luxury brand.226 The court drew a marked distinction from the court’s decision in the WGACA case because WGACA “prominently featured the Chanel brand through promotional advertising that was Chanel specific” and “its
social media pages included quotations of CoCo Chanel and photographs of
Chanel products accompanied by the hashtags #WGACACHANEL.”227 The
court stated that their advertising and authenticity guarantee was “materially
different from the authenticity statements on [TRR’s] website.”228
However, the court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to trademark counterfeiting/infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), and unfair competition under New

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ.,
LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir. 2016)).
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Chanel, Inc. v. What Goes Around Comes Around, LLC, No. 18
Civ. 2253 (LLS), 2018 WL 4440507, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2018)).
224. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 439–40.
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228. Id.

2021]

A No-No from Coco

469

York common law.229 The court determined that Chanel sufficiently alleged
that TRR marketed and sold counterfeit Chanel products, and that TRR’s
advertising regarding the authenticity of the products is “literally false.”230
Even though TRR argued that their liability for trademark infringement for
counterfeit sales should be foreclosed by Tiffany (NJ), Inc v. eBay, Inc., the
court held that the analogy to Tiffany was not persuasive and even suggests
that companies like TRR “would be liable for direct infringement based on
the sale of counterfeit goods.”231 The Second Circuit in Tiffany held that
eBay’s knowledge in the sale of counterfeits “is relevant to the issue of
whether eBay contributed to the direct infringement of Tiffany’s mark” but
“is not a basis for a claim of direct infringement against eBay.”232 Further,
the Second Circuit determined that to “impose liability because eBay cannot
guarantee the genuineness of all of the purported Tiffany products offered on
its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine Tiffany
goods.”233 The reasoning in Tiffany “is premised on the fact that eBay did not
itself sell counterfeit goods; only the fraudulent vendors did,” which is different than TRR’s business.234
TRR retains the power to “reject for sale, set prices, and create marketing for goods,” and TRR “maintains the inventory of merchandise” and
“bears the risk of loss” for all the products.235 Therefore, the court maintained, TRR’s sale of the counterfeits is sufficient use for it to be liable for
trademark infringement.236 By adopting this type of business model—where
TRR “controls a secondary market for trademarked luxury goods”—the court
concluded that TRR “must bear the corresponding burden of the potential
liability.”237
With respect to the false advertising claims, the court held that the advertisements “regarding the authenticity of the products [TRR] sells, considered in context, are literally false.”238 The court went further to say that even
229. Id. at 429.
230. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 429.
231. Id. at 440; see Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2009)
(Held that eBay was not liable for trademark infringement based on counterfeits sold because eBay’s platform allowed users to directly list products. eBay
did not guarantee authenticity of products nor did it have any part in the
description of the items listed.).
232. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103).
233. Id. at 441.
234. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 441 (citing El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d
392, 396 (2d Cir. 1986)).
237. Id.
238. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 443.
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if the advertisements were not held to be “literally false,” they would still
likely to mislead or confuse customers.239 Specifically, the court determined
that TRR’s statement that they “ensure every item on The RealReal is 100%
the real thing” is an “unambiguous representation of fact that all the products
advertised and sold” are 100% authentic.240 Considering Chanel’s allegations
that certain counterfeits were sold on TRR’s website as authentic, this context “suffices to establish a plausible allegation of literal false advertising.”241
However, the court did state that “a disclaimer might suffice” to protect TRR
when the authentication procedures do not “immediately catch every instance
of attempted deception.”242
Lastly, because the court rejected Chanel’s Lanham Act claims for
TRR’s genuine use of Chanel Trademarks, the court also similarly rejected
Chanel’s New York common law claims.243 However, because of the alleged
sale of counterfeit items, the court held that Chanel had sufficiently alleged
that TRR “advertised and sold counterfeit Chanel products under circumstances evidencing bad faith.”244 The court found persuasive Chanel’s independent investigation of the alleged counterfeits and Chanel’s findings of
TRR removing identifying serial numbers from Chanel products.245 The court
did recognize that discovery “might demonstrate that [TRR] had honest motives for removing these serial numbers,” but Chanel’s allegations were sufficient “to allege bad faith at this stage.”246
The court, however, did grant the motion to dismiss with respect to Chanel’s claims under Sections 349 and 350 of New York General Business Law
because Chanel did not demonstrate “this dispute involves injury to the public interest over and above ordinary trademark infringement.”247 Chanel’s
First Amended Complaint only alleged specific injury to themselves and the
individuals that received counterfeit products but only made conclusory
statements regarding injury to the public at large.248 The only case where
TRR’s counterfeit sales were alone sufficient to invoke public interest are
“cases in which defendants knowingly perpetuated counterfeiting schemes

239. Id.
240. Id. at 443–44.
241. Id. at 440.
242. Id. at 444 (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103).
243. Id. at 447.
244. The RealReal, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 447.
245. Id.
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248. Id.
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with an intent to deceive consumers,” but there were no facts to suggest that
this happened in this case.249
4.

The RealReal’s Counterclaims

TRR filed an amended answer on November 24, 2020, alleging new
counterclaims for antitrust, unfair competition, and tortious interference.250
TRR claimed the action arose out of Chanel’s unlawful efforts to bar secondhand sellers from selling Chanel goods under the guise of protecting its
trademark.251 These counterclaims were based on actions by Chanel that included “limiting supply and raising prices when it perceives its bags” are
“being carried by too many people”; “taking the position that only Chanel
can authenticate its handbags because ‘only Chanel itself can know what is
genuinely Chanel,’ while simultaneously refusing to license its authentication
database to competitors”; and using “its monopoly power” to cause retailers
and publishers to end partnerships with the TRR.252
TRR first alleged that Chanel’s relevant market shares of 30% to 50%
are sufficient to adequately plead monopolization with due consideration of
the “relationship between market share and other relevant market characteristics.”253 TRR noted that the Second Circuit held “a party may have monopoly
power over a particular market, even though its market share is less than
50%.”254 Thus, taking into account not only Chanel’s relevant market share
but also Chanel’s specific actions in the market, Chanel has maintained a
monopoly on their products.255 TRR pointed to the actions stated above, and
TRR has alleged that Chanel “has tolerated similar conduct by Farfetch, in
which it has a significant investment and/or partnerships and affirmatively
refrained from pursuing litigation against Farfetch while pursuing actions
against other competitors for similar actions.”256
Further, TRR alleged that Chanel tortiously interfered with contracts
with Saks and Neiman Marcus by causing both stores to forego contracts
with TRR after Chanel “threatened to pull all of its products” from their
stores “if [the stores] did not make immediate changes.”257 TRR also alleged
249. Id. at 448.
250. See First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses And Counterclaims at
18–19, Chanel, Inc. v. The RealReal, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-10626 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 2021)
251. Reply in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for Leave, supra note 126, at 1.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 11–12.
254. Id. at 12 (quoting Hayden Pub. Co. v. Cox Broad. Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 69 n. 7
(2d Cir. 1984)).
255. Id. at 15.
256. Id.
257. Reply in Support of The RealReal’s Motion for Leave, supra note 126, at 26.
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that Chanel tortiously interfered with their prospective business relations.258
TRR claimed they were set to run advertisements in Women’s Wear Daily,
but the advertisement were cancelled “at the behest of a ‘huge partner.’ ”259
TRR claimed that “these facts give rise to at least a plausible inference that
but for Chanel’s interference, the advertisements in [Women’s Wear Daily]
would have run.”260
V.

PARTNERSHIPS ARE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF
LUXURY BRANDS

Secondhand retailers have never had legal issues with reselling goods
because they have traditionally fallen squarely within the first sale doctrine.261 In fact, having an established secondhand market creates a larger
market for retail brands because consumers are willing to spend more if they
know that they will be able to resell these goods eventually.262 Encouraging
luxury brands to partner with these secondhand retailers not only benefits
them, but also avoids the creation of a monopoly over luxury products. In
this way, brands’ reputations are protected by ensuring that the goods marketed as “authentic” are, and further, this secondhand market is protected for
the consumers’ benefit.
A.

Chanel has Rightful Concerns about Retail Websites

Chanel has spent over a century creating and cultivating their luxury
brand.263 To protect this vision, they have spent “hundreds-of-millions (if not
billions)” of dollars marketing and defending their intellectual property
rights.264 While secondhand luxury websites are not attempting to completely
replace their presence in the market, Chanel is rightfully concerned about a
number of issues.
First, one of the benefits of obtaining trademark rights is the ability to
choose who to license their mark to and when to license.265 This is an important right because it allows the company to generate more revenue and have
258. Id. at 25.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands,
supra note 3.
262. See id.
263. History of the Brand: Chanel, L’ÉTOILE DE SAINT HONORÉ (June 5, 2020),
https://etoile-luxuryvintage.com/blogs/news/history-of-the-brand-chanel
[https://perma.cc/7D37-CVNH].
264. The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands,
supra note 3.
265. Rosaya, supra note 46, § 1:25.
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their mark expand into new areas.266 However, this right also requires companies to perform due diligence on all of their licensees—such as ensuring
quality control, contemplating any restrictions with distribution channels, and
determining what rights are lawfully given to the licensees.267 Because of
these requirements, it is vital for companies to make thoughtful decisions on
who to license the intellectual property rights.
While both TRR and WGACA are not licensees, Chanel is likely concerned that the services and products they are providing to the public are
analogous to the rights a licensee might have. If these companies can obtain
almost the same rights as a licensee would, it might deter other companies in
the future from trying to license the Chanel mark because they could obtain it
without paying for it. Likewise, because they are not licensees, Chanel has no
control over the use of their marks with respect to these secondhand retailers.
This loss of control is frankly frightening to all luxury companies, not just
Chanel.268
Further, Chanel has expressed concern that the “resale business model
relies heavily on the leveraging of the appeal and esteem of the world’s most
famous luxury brands and their valuable intellectual property.”269 Presumably, they are concerned that the secondhand retail websites are both blurring
and tarnishing their brand. The blurring concerns stem from the fact that
these brands are considered luxury from the mere fact that they are limited in
supply and expensive.270 “After all, what’s the real luxury in being a ‘have’ if
hordes of logo-loving former have-nots can own the same products?”271
The tarnishment concerns emanate from Chanel’s assertion of counterfeits allegedly sold on the secondhand websites.272 Counterfeits are not only
likely to be of less quality than genuine goods, but they also “erode the status-symbol allure” of the luxury goods.273 The lesser quality of the counterfeits “hijack” the promise of luxury brands—”using high quality
materials”—that is exacerbated when the customer believes they are purchasing the real thing.274 Further, counterfeits destroy the luxury brands “bottom
line” by poaching customers away from their products and forcing luxury
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury
Brands, supra note 3.
269. Id.
270. See Hurt, supra note 14.
271. See id.
272. See Chanel to The RealReal: Your So-Called Authentication “Experts” Aren’t
Really Experts at All, supra note 200.
273. Orscheln, supra note 95, at 257.
274. Id. at 259.
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brands to spend “millions of dollars each year fighting against
counterfeiting.”275
B.

Despite the Concerns, Partnering with Secondhand Retail
Websites is Actually in Brands’ Best Interests

Even with the numerous concerns luxury brands have about secondhand
websites, partnerships between the two creates a mutually beneficial relationship. First, secondhand retail websites increase luxury brands’ market because it serves as a “gateway drug” for consumers to purchase luxury
goods.276 The CEO of Vestiaire Collective insists that luxury and resale “are
more aptly described as allies” because resale serves as a “point of entrylevel access for young customers who can’t yet shop full price luxury.”277
Similarly, the CEO of Tradesy suggests that the resale market “leads to customers making more purchases at retail” because when the customer “knows
she can resell her item, she’s going to be more willing to pay a little more for
it.”278 Further, Wainwright, the CEO and founder of TRR, contends “people
are buying both new and previously owned” luxury goods suggesting that the
two are not mutually exclusive.279
The notion of the resale market being an asset to luxury brands instead
of a competitor emboldens when considering the age range and values of the
largest luxury consumers—Millennials and Gen Z.280 A decade ago, the luxury market was “dominated by baby boomers and Gen X,” but today, “Gen Z
and Millennials are currently the largest consumer group in retail.”281 These
younger consumers represent “around $350 billion of spending power in the
United States alone.”282
This change not only represents a new target but also suggests that luxury brands will need to consider a “completely different set of values.”283
This “new-gen of luxury fashion” have grown up in the age of the internet, so
“tapping into this market” requires a “radically robust retail strategy” that is
“equally effective online as it is offline.”284 Luxe Digital Online identified
the four main drivers of luxury resale growth as “digital, affordability, col275. Id. at 256–59.
276. The Rocky Relationship Between Luxury Resale and (Some) Luxury Brands,
supra note 3.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Sharuddin, supra note 31.
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lectability, and changing consumer preferences towards sustainability and
experiences.”285
Some brands, like Gucci, have taken this change in stride.286 Recognizing the appeal of these online secondhand websites, Gucci protects their
brand by increasing their own digital platform to redirect the new generation
of consumers away from online secondhand retailers to their own website.287
Gucci’s creative director Alessandro Michelle began with “a complete ecommerce overhaul” that contributed “6% of Gucci’s total revenue” their
first financial quarter since the website went live.288 In 2020, Gucci announced a new “video based shopping experience called ‘Gucci Live.’ ”289
The new platform “recreates the personalized experience of visiting a physical store with a sales assistant tending solely to the customer.”290
Gucci remains one the best performing luxury brands online.291 This
suggests that secondhand retailers were not competitive solely because they
were also selling luxury goods, albeit secondhand, but they detract consumers away from the luxury brands themselves due to the brands’ lack of online
presence. Instead of attempting to rid the market of secondhand retailers,
brands should protect themselves with a market strategy overhaul. Recognizing that younger consumers shop online more than any generation in the past
requires a shift from the brands’ traditional methods of supplying luxury
fashion to consumers.
However, physical stores are not yet a thing of the past—they are still
projected to account for “75% of forecast sales in 2025.”292 But, as digital
commerce continues to rise, luxury brands are “shifting their approach” to
“flagship outlets” instead.293 These stores are “focusing on the experience”
and “feature display showrooms to drive online sales, rather than compete
against it.”294 Geoff Cook, Base Design’s partner, explains that “millennials
are more focused on experiences which inherently incorporate what they

285. Helen Siwak, The Rise of Pre-Owned Luxury Fashion Marks Shift Amid Sustainability Movement, RETAIL INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.retail-insider.com/retail-insider/2020/03/the-rise-of-pre-owned-luxury-fashion-marksshift-amid-sustainability-movement/ [https://perma.cc/DBD4-YUBL].
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value: sharing time together, transparency or realness, and perhaps learning
or doing something along the way.”295
Additionally, Millennials “generally have a lower disposable income
than their predecessors.”296 This relates back to the idea that secondhand luxury retail acts as an important “gateway drug” for consumers to become
hooked on buying luxury retail.297 While Millennials might not have the
means of purchasing brand new luxury goods now, they can purchase
secondhand luxury goods at resale prices, and in the future, sell those items
to purchase new or used products.298 Partnering with secondhand retail websites in exchange for consumer data could be vital for the successful marketing to the new generations—”from social media mentions, browsing history,
purchasing trends, and spending habits, luxury brands can discover what
their young consumers are buying, when they choose to buy, and what they
might buy next.”299
Further, Millennials are not just looking for quality pieces and experiences, they also want authenticity and ethical impact from brands.300 Traditionally, luxury brands had one purpose—”create a superior and exclusive
product to maintain the status quo of the rich and famous.”301 However, Millennials and Gen Z consumers have “radically different behaviors and attitudes towards all consumption and lifestyle.”302 A Deloitte study found that
“89% of U.S. millennials often consider whether a brand is ‘sustainable and
ethical’ before making a purchasing decision.”303 Further, a Nielson study
revealed that “81% of millennials expect the brands they buy into to be transparent in their marketing and actively talk about their sustainability
impact.”304
In response, the Kering Group—owner of brands like Gucci and
Balenciaga—initiated the “use of renewable raw materials in response to sustainability.”305 “Influencers” around the world encourage consumers to shop
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secondhand to cut down on the fashion industry’s environmental impact.306
Most of the push around shopping secondhand is in an effort to deter the
harmful social and environmental effects of fast fashion; nevertheless, the
popularity of luxury secondhand online retailers has also increased due to the
sustainability movement.307 Now, “distinctive style” is “a medley of vintage
and modern, high-end and accessible brands, tailored and sports styles, and
an embracing of repeating and repurposing what already exists in your
closet.”308 Secondhand fashion is “predicted to overtake the fast fashion market by 2029.”309
One thing is noticeably clear by the popularity of the sustainability
movement—”consumers of all ages have indicated that supporting the resale
market is something that they are very keen on and any brands not moving in
that direction, will very possibly be left behind.”310 Resale companies are
only continuing to increase in popularity.311 If Chanel continues to try and
shut down the sale of their products through these online retailers, there
could be dire consequences for their brand in the eyes of the younger consumers. While Chanel masquerades behind trademark infringement concerns,
the outcome for secondhand retail could be dire. The secondhand retailers
would be left with two options if Chanel refuses to partner with them to
ensure proper authentication procedures—stop selling Chanel products or
risk a lawsuit every time a Chanel product is sold. By partnering with the
online retailers to ensure proper authentication procedures, Chanel can obtain
valuable consumer data and notoriety as a brand concerned with supporting
the sustainability movement. Further, this partnership will eliminate the concern of counterfeits as Chanel could properly authenticate their products.
Lastly, the ramifications of this string of lawsuits could end up being a
PR disaster for Chanel. TRR has claimed that Chanel launched these lawsuits
not only out of concern of infringement of their trademark rights but also “in
an effort to maintain a monopoly.”312 In their amended answer, TRR asserted
antitrust and unfair competition claims alleging that “Chanel has been quietly
306. Anna Fox, Second Hand September: Influencers Ditch Fast Fashion and Encourage Sustainable Shopping, VEGAN REV. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://theveganreview.com/second-hand-september-influencers-ditch-fast-fashion-andencourage-sustainable-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/PYS5-7GKJ].
307. Siwak, supra note 285; see also Fox, supra note 306.
308. Siwak, supra note 285.
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312. Chanel is Maintaining a “Monopoly” with the Help of Big-Name Retailers,
Publishers, The RealReal Claims in New Filing, FASHION L. (Oct. 30, 2020),
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carrying out an ‘aggressive campaign’ of ‘exclusionary and anticompetitive
conduct’ aimed at ‘monopolizing the market’ ” to the “detriment of its competitors and consumers, alike.”313 TRR also alleged that Chanel has “illegally
stymie[d] competition” by “entering into exclusive contracts with high-end
retailers and used its monopoly power to force them to refuse to engage in
any ancillary relationship with resale competitors.”314
TRR specifically asserted that it was due to enter partnerships with Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth Avenue around 2015 until “Chanel threatened to
pull all of its products from their stores unless both retailers agreed to prevent
consumers from consigning Chanel products to TRR in their stores.”315 TRR
claimed that “Chanel used its position as the most powerful luxury brand to
force” New York Magazine, Vogue, The New York Times, and Women’s Wear
Daily “into an agreement not to deal with TRR.”316 Even worse, TRR pointed
out that while they and WGACA have both been sued, “ ‘one major secondary reseller’. . .has been ‘notably absent in Chanel’s war’ ”—Farfetch.317
Conveniently, Chanel “made a significant investment” to this company in
February 2018.318 TRR claimed that Farfetch “promotes, advertises, markets,
sells,” and “guarantees the authenticity” of pre-owned Chanel goods “in
much the same way as TRR and WGACA.”319 TRR explained that this shows
that “Chanel will only tolerate the resale of Chanel handbags . . . by a company in which [it] holds a significant investment.”320
Since these lawsuits are currently ongoing, the truth of the allegations
has yet to be ascertained. However, if these claims have any truth to them, it
is not hard to imagine the backlash Chanel will face for these monopolistic
practices. Additionally, the fact that Farfetch is noticeably absent from suit
for the seemingly same practices implies a possible ulterior motive for the
suits that would undermine any rightful concerns of trademark infringement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Secondhand retail websites and luxury brands should partner with each
other to create the most beneficial shopping experience to customers. While
luxury brands rightfully have concerns over the competition raised by these
online retailers, secondhand retailers increase the market reach of luxury
brands. Younger consumers shop online more than any other generation,
313. Id.
314. Id.
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have less disposable income than the traditional shoppers, and care about the
impact the fashion industry has on the environment. Secondhand retailers
further the goal of attaining sustainable practices endorsed by Millennials
and Gen Z. By partnering with secondhand online retailers, luxury brands
will increase their market reach, ensure authenticity, and support the ideals
their largest consumer base believes in.

